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Abstract. In Aischylos’ Eumenides, Apollo intimates a theory according to which the father is the sole genetic pa-
rent of the child. The status of this conception, and whether it is depicted as an outlandish idea, has been much and 
inconclusively discussed. This paper considers a neglected piece of evidence: Apollo’s use of the very unusual word 
αὐτάδελφον when addressing Hermes. In light of the Greeks’ awareness of this etymology as well as the other 
instances of this rare word in tragedy, the author argues that Aischylos’ text highlights the etymological connection 
to δελφύς, the womb, thus evoking the role of the mother. This suggests that Aischylos subtly lets his, and Apollo’s, 
language rebel against the notion of merely paternal kinship, and the concomitant ideas about revenge, retaliation 
and children’s obligations to their parent.
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Tėvas, įsčios, kraujas. Apolono embriologinė teorija, keršto etika ir  
tariama moterų atskirtis Aischilo tragedijoje Eumenidės
Santrauka. Aischilo tragedijoje Eumenidės Apolonas užsimena apie teoriją, pagal kurią tėvas yra vienintelis vaiko 
biologinis gimdytojas. Apie šios sampratos statusą ir tai, ar ji pateikiama kaip svetima ir keista idėja, būta daug, 
tačiau bevaisių diskusijų. Straipsnyje nagrinėjamas vienas pražiūrėtas įrodymo elementas – itin neįprastas žodis 
αὐτάδελφον, Apolono pavartotas kreipiantis į Hermį. Atsižvelgdamas į tai, jog graikai žinojo šio žodžio etimologiją, 
taip pat į kitus šio reto žodžio vartojimo tragedijoje atvejus, straipsnio autorius teigia, kad Aischilo tekste išryškinama 
etimologinė sąsaja su žodžiu δελφύς „įsčios“, taip primenant ir apie motinos vaidmenį. Tai reiškia, jog Aischilas (ir 
Apolonas) savo kalba subtiliai maištauja prieš giminystės, pagrįstos tik tėvo vaidmeniu, sampratą ir su ja susijusias 
idėjas apie kerštą, atpildą ir vaikų pareigas gimdytojui.
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In the final play of Aischylos’ Oresteia, Apollo develops a doctrine of blood relations 
according to which only the father is related to the child, while the mother serves as a mere 
vessel and nourishing device1. The argument serves the purpose of defending a political 
morality according to which there are strong obligations vis-à-vis one’s father, but not 
the mother – in this case, retaliatory killing for the sake of the male parent. The theory, 
its origins, normative implications, plausibility for an Athenian audience and function in 
the play have been much discussed in the literature. The implications of these issues are 
far-reaching – the role of the god and the gods, that of women in the family and in socie-
ty, and the evolution of normative argument in ancient Greek thought are all important 
questions raised by the debate. Is it really possible that the Athenians took this argument 
about exclusively male generation seriously or found their preconceptions of women and 
blood relations confirmed by it? In the following, I will consider a neglected piece of 
evidence. Apollo calls his brother Hermes αὐτάδελφον αἷμα; the words have often been 
rendered as “my own blood brother, begotten of the same father” or something similar that 
is consistent with the god’s view of kinship (A. Eu. 89)2. I will, however, argue that the 
expression evokes the role of the womb and hence the mother, that it revolts against the 
theory expounded by Apollo, and that the wording suggests that the theory and Apollo’s 
argument are one-sided. Moreover, the interpretation developed in this paper resonates 
with a number of fundamental questions about Greek society and law. While it is almost 
universally held that the Oresteia is the mise-en-scène of female subordination and male 
domination – “the basic issue in the trilogy is the establishment […] of patriarchal marriage 
where wife’s subordination and patrilineal succession are reaffirmed” (Zeitlin 1984, 159; 
cf. Rocco 1997, 144; Foley 2001, 201–202) – there is, I will argue, reason to believe that 
Aischylos’ text subtly undermines the argument given for it by Apollo.
The argument will unfold as follows. After having discussed previous research about 
the legal debate in the Eumenides in general, we will look at the words αὐτάδελφον αἷμα 
and how they have been understood more specifically. The next section of the article will 
explore the etymology of αὐτάδελφον, the relevance of etymological considerations in 
Aischylos, and the uterine connotation in the word. Subsequently I will discuss other 
instances of the word and argue that they all occur in contexts that call attention precisely 
to the womb. Summing up, I will make the case that Apollo’s use of αὐτάδελφον evokes 
its root, the uterus, and that this creates a remarkable tension between the embryological 
and normative doctrine expounded by the god on the one hand and his language, indeed 
that of the Greeks, on the other hand. To put it boldly, Aischylos lets language itself rebel 
against the god’s words.
1 The author would like to thank Giulia Maria Chesi, Dimitrios Iordanoglou, Emanuel Karlsson, Fredrik 
Sixtensson and Amanda Walldoff for invaluable comments and critique at various stages. I also wish to send a 
thank you note into the nebula of anonymous refereeing – a number of unknown readers have constructively and 
generously shared their knowledge, advice and critique, helping me improve the argument in more places than I can 
recognize. The system of peer review does not always bring forward the better part of human nature; therefore, it is 
a pleasure to acknowledge the generosity and help of unknown others when they have been more helpful than one 
could ever expect.
2 This translation in: Sommerstein 2008, 365. Translations are mine when not otherwise stated.
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Gods, Egyptians, Anaxagoras and the state of the question
The assessments of Apollo’s ideas about kinship and generation in the Oresteia have 
been spectacularly divergent. During the court debate, Apollo claims that the father is the 
sole parent in a stricter sense, and that the mother merely nourishes the child: οὐκ ἔστι 
μήτηρ ἡ κεκλημένη τέκνου | τοκεύς, “the so-called mother is not the child’s parent” 
(Eu. 658–659). Instead, she is just a τροφός, “nurse” (Eu. 659)3. The chorus of Erinyes 
accusing Orestes have previously argued that there is a difference between killing blood 
relatives and relatives by marriage, and that they thus only persecute the former. When 
Orestes asks why the Erinyes did not punish his mother for killing his father, they reply 
that Klytaimestra did not murder her own kin – in a particular sense: οὐκ ἦν ὅμαιμος 
φωτὸς ὃν κατέκτανεν, “she was not of the same blood as the man that she killed”, un-
like Agamemnon, who slaughtered his own daughter Iphigeneia (Eu. 605)4. The Erinyes’ 
exclusive interest in punishing the killing of blood relations may have been an Aischylean 
invention for the purpose of showing their one-sidedness; others have claimed that this 
was their traditional function (Wilamowitz 1914, 222). This issue has been much – and 
inconclusively – discussed, and need not detain us here (Winnington-Ingram 1983, 120; 
Croiset 1928, 244–245; Dirksen 1965, 57; Reinhardt 1949, 147; Fischer 1965, 59). Yet 
Apollo’s claim responds to the argument made by the Erinyes: even if their duty is that 
of persecuting those who have killed their own kin, Orestes does not fall under their 
jurisdiction, for children are not blood relatives of their mother.
But what is the status of this argument? Christian Meier argues that regardless of 
Aischylos’ view of the matter, the audience must have perceived the theory as a “Unge-
heuerlichkeit”, “monstrosity” (Meier 1983, 182; likewise Reinhardt 1949, 148, criticized 
by Schneider 1974, 322–323). Anne Lebeck says that Apollo’s theory is portrayed as 
having a “shaky foundation” (Lebeck 1971, 128, cf. 122). Nicole Loraux likewise asserts 
that the god’s view comes across as an “extrêmisme” (Loraux 1990, 129). In a slightly 
different vein, Alan Sommerstein suggests that the spectators are likely to have thought 
of the argument as a “specious but fallacious piece of forensic pleading” (Sommerstein 
1989, 208). Giulia Maria Chesi has even made the argument that the entire text of the 
Oresteia systematically subverts the recurring attempts to deny the role of mothers in 
procreation and the rearing of children (Chesi 2014, passim, e.g., 186). Common to these 
arguments is the assumption that for Aischylos, the god’s claim simply does not constitute 
a compelling reason (Dirksen 1965, 49; cf. Rechenauer 2001, 61).
On the other hand, some have made the case that Apollo’s doctrine should be under-
stood as divine in a non-trivial sense; Wolfgang Rösler, in his analysis of Presocratic ideas 
in Aischylos, contends that Apollo’s claim must be considered as “göttliche Wahrheit” 
in the context (Rösler 1970, 75). Some have even suggested that this kind of view was 
3 This may allude to the nurse in the Libation Bearers, who rescues Orestes from his mother, thereby subverting 
her motherhood.
4 But cf. Chesi 2014, 19, who suggests that Klytaimestra could be making an opposed yet symmetrical 
argument, that is, that the mother is the only parent.
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“widely held” in 5th century Athens (Kuhns 1962, 46–47; likewise Zeitlin 1984, 180; see 
also Songe-Møller 1999, 29, 31, but contrast 155, 159). At least, some argue, the god’s 
position is more valid or true than that of the Erinyes (Grossmann 1970, 224).
A third strand of interpretation includes scholars who argue that the embryological 
argument would have seemed to be neither inherently flawed nor very persuasive in its 
context (Winnington-Ingram 1983, 123). In this vein, it has been claimed that the debate 
establishes a “vero e proprio conflitto di autorità” in the play (Citti 1962, 108). The re- 
sult would simply be ambiguous, or the perception would be that both sides are, in some 
sense, right (Lesky 1931, 211).
It would seem, then, that it is difficult to tell what standing Apollo’s embryological view 
has in the tragedy (Fischer 1965, 90). It has even been argued that the argument itself is 
depicted as irrelevant in the drama (Croiset 1928, 254). The origins of the conception of 
male generation have likewise been discussed and are surely relevant to our understanding 
of it. It has often been held that Aischylos must have derived the idea from Anaxagoras, 
who had (at least according to Aristotle’s Generation of animals) defended this theory 
(Arist. GA 763b31-3). As pointed out by Sommerstein, however, this hypothesis does not 
answer the question about the perceived validity of the idea in the context of the Eumenides 
(Sommerstein 1989, 206–208). Moreover, it has instead been asserted that Aischylos was 
in all likelihood familiar with the notion of exclusive paternal generation not from Greek 
natural philosophy, but from Egyptian sources (Peretti 1956, 249). The Greeks thought of 
Egypt as an inverted and strange world, and it could thus be argued that such an Egyptian 
connection could make Apollo’s embryological doctrine look outlandish too (on Egypt: 
Hdt. II. 35). There is, however, probably good reason to be cautious in drawing conclu-
sions about the role of the theory in the trilogy on the basis of such considerations (but 
cf. Chesi 2014, 159). Furthermore, while it has often been claimed that some aspect of 
Apollo’s argument is inconsistent, the relevance of incoherences or logical inconsistency 
has seldom been stated clearly or addressed directly in studies on Aischylos, but rather 
often been taken for granted (Solmsen 1949, 62)5.
There is, then, little scholarly consensus about how Apollo’s embryological argument 
for the killing of Klytaimestra is to be evaluated. It is time to look at a different piece of 
evidence.
The siblings and their parent
In the following we will, as I said, see that an intriguing expression at the beginning of 
the play may provide a key to understanding how Apollo’s doctrine was depicted in the 
drama. This is perhaps a detail. Yet we will discover that this detail brings out a world of 
intriguing problems.
After speaking to Orestes, Apollo addresses Hermes (who is probably absent), asking 
that he look out for the suppliant (on Hermes’ absence: Taplin 1977, 364–365): σὺ δ᾽, 
5 Mark Griffith has even suggested that Aischylos has “relatively little interest in [...] logical consistency” 
(Griffith 2009, 31).
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αὐτάδελφον αἷμα καὶ κοινοῦ πατρός, | Ἑρμῆ, φύλασσε (Eu. 89–90). Alan Sommer-
stein translates these words as “you, my own blood brother, begotten of the same father, 
Hermes, guard him” (translation in Sommerstein 2008, 365). The expression αὐτάδελφον 
αἷμα has generated relatively little interest. Some critics have quoted the words without 
commenting on them (Headlam & Thomson 1966 and Conacher 1987 do not mention 
it; Chesi 2014, 162 quotes the words but does not discuss them). The formulation has 
typically been understood as “blood, very much that of a sibling”, that is, stressing the 
bond between the two brothers Apollo and Hermes. Sommerstein thus claims that “for 
[Apollo] the phrases αὐτάδελφον αἷμα and (παῖς) κοινοῦ πατρός are synonymous” 
(Sommerstein 1989, 99; cf. Blass 1907, 80). Similarly, Anthony Podlecki says that “this 
is something of a redundancy”, that is, both expressions – “very brotherly” and “of the 
same father” – convey the same idea (Podlecki 1989, 136). These views trade heavily 
on the assumption that αὐτάδελφος simply means ἀδελφός, brother. Groeneboom 
likewise says that the former is “een poëtische versterking”, “a poetic intensifier”, of the 
latter (Groeneboom 1952, 106). This implies that the αὐτ- prefix merely adds intensity, 
“very much that of a sibling”.
According to Apollo’s theory, Hermes is indeed his brother; his conception of heredity 
emphasizes the bond father-child, indeed eliminates kinship between mother and child. 
Citing αὐτάδελφον αἷμα, Simon Goldhill thus speaks of “[t]he implication that Hermes 
is absolute kin with Apollo” (Goldhill 1984, 213). But there is a strange problem. The 
prefix αὐτ- implies sameness. Hermes and Apollo have the same father, but not the same 
mother. Yet ἀδελφός is clearly related to δελφύς, “womb”, and the word’s prefix, a cop-
ulative ἀ-, indicates a relation of identity, belonging or sameness. Etymologically, then, 
ἀδελφός signifies “from the same womb”. And this highlights the mother as the common 
origin, not the father. Benveniste thus speaks of an implied “fraternité co-utérine” in the 
word ἀδελφός (Benveniste 2003, 219, cf. 213–214, 220–221). Unlike Greek φράτηρ, 
likewise designating the brother (Proto-Indo-European *bhrāter, Avestan brātar-, Latin 
frater, Lithuanian brolis, Russian брат, English brother, Swedish broder and so on), 
which had acquired a political sense in Greek (designating men belonging to the same 
phratry, including non-kin), ἀδελφός does thus originally signify siblings with reference 
to the mother, not the father.
The etymology is confirmed in the standard etymological works (Chantraine 1968–
1980, I, 19; Frisk 1960–1970, I, 19; Beekes 2010, s.v. ἀδελφός). And it establishes a 
tension in Apollo’s argument. The god who believes in exclusively male generation, the 
god who excludes the mother from the family in the stricter sense, addresses his brother 
by the same father with reference to what they do in fact not have in common – the uterus 
of the mother.
It could be objected that ἀδελφός simply meant “brother” without any distinction 
between different kinds of siblingship, and that the word had become lexicalized, that 
is, that the etymology may well have been long forgotten at the time. The reference to 
the same womb, δελφύς, has been explained by possible matrilinear traditions in the 
pre-Hellenic population of the geographic areas that later became Greece (Kretschmer 
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1910)6. The notion of siblings as co-uterine relations was, or so someone could argue, less 
germane to the Greeks, and hence the original meaning may simply have been forgotten. 
But this is not correct.
There is every reason to believe that the Greeks were in fact aware not only of the 
etymology of the word ἀδελφός as a distant beginning, but still felt the force of the word’s 
origin. Hesychios defines ἀδελφοί as οἱ ἐκ τῆς αὐτῆς δελφύος γεγονότες. Δελφὺς 
γὰρ ἡ μήτρα λέγεται “those who are born from the same womb; for the uterus is called 
delphys” (col. 32, s.v. ἀδελφοί). Centuries away, then, a dictionary explains the word in 
accordance with its roots. Moreover, Aristotle laconically notes that the word ἀδελφοί 
derives from δελφύς, the womb, and that brothers are thus called brothers with reference 
to the womb of their mother (Arist. HA 510b13). Hesychios’ terminology deviates from 
that of Aristotle, who is more precise in distinguishing between on the one hand ὑστέρα, 
δελφύς, the uterus in the stricter sense, and on the other hand μήτρα, the vagina. Yet the 
point is clear: the etymology was still known in the classical period and beyond, and the 
Greeks would plausibly have heard womb in the word brother. And as we shall see, the 
word is not innocent – Aischylos’ language rarely, if ever, is7.
The use and possible abuse of etymology
It would seem, then, that αὐτάδελφον αἷμα καὶ κοινοῦ πατρός cannot really mean 
“my own blood brother, begotten of the same father”. Instead, the expression creates a 
tension or even inconsistency: the word αὐτάδελφον is etymologically speaking not 
compatible with κοινοῦ πατρός, “of the same father”, in the case of Apollo and Hermes. 
It could be objected that “etymology” is a problematic concept in the interpretation of 
the Greek imaginary, and that the Greeks had a very different understanding of words. To 
begin with, however, we should note that Aischylos himself sometimes uses ἐτήτυμος 
and ἐτητύμως in order to indicate either the origin or the “true” meaning of a word, e.g., 
when saying that Right, personified as the goddess Dike, is Διὸς κόρα, “daughter of Zeus” 
(Cho. 948, cf. Ag. 167). Modern scholarship will, needless to say, disagree with Aischylos’ 
words, if taken as a claim about the actual linguistic descent of the name Dike. But as 
an “etymological derivation” it is etymological in a different sense (Goldhill 1984, 62, 
cf. 239). In this context, we need to include not only folk etymology, but also what Ais-
chylos himself may or may not have considered a fiction on his part, indeed an invented 
kinship between words and sounds. This is not to say that we are entitled to lose sight 
of the true etymology, that is, the question of the real origin of a word. But etymological 
speculations in Greek culture were if not frivolous, then at least remarkably flexible with 
6 Cf. however Gonda 1962 (the present argument is agnostic with regard to these historical questions).
7 The conception of parenthood in Greek societies seems to have implied a stronger genetic relation between 
mother and child. As has been pointed out in the context of Orestes’ court case, the Athenian legal system “in important 
respects treated the bond between mother and child as closer than that between father and child” (Sommerstein 1989, 
207). This goes for adoption as well as marriage between half-siblings (who could only be allowed to marry if they 
were children of the same father, not of the same mother, implying that they were considered to be “more related” if 
they had the same mother – see Wilgaux 2011).
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regard to phonetic similarities and semantics (Lallot 1991). And particularly in Aischylos, 
meaning is created by way of aetiological as well as “contaminational” etymology, and 
any interpretation with a claim to precision will need to take this into account (Dougherty 
1991, 123; on “contaminational” etymology, see Grintser 2008, 93). In the case of Δίκη 
and Διὸς κόρα, ἐτήτυμος is likely to mean “true”, and Aischylos’ words need not have 
much to do with the origin of the word Δίκη, but just express an idea about the truth of 
such a correlation (Sier 1988, 291; Garvie 1986, 309–310). Yet it is clear that Aischylos, 
in identifying this (false, according to modern usage) etymology, plays on the elements 
of the word, its phonetic properties and potential, and that the result can be construed 
as a claim to truth8. We may, then, surmise that Aischylos is not only aware of the (true, 
according to a stricter conception of “etymological”) etymology of ἀδελφός, but that he 
may be expected to explore its possible meanings when employing αὐτάδελφος9.
Thus far, I have discussed αὐτάδελφος as if it were just a special case of ἀδελφός. I 
have argued that the word conjures up the idea of the womb, and that this creates a peculiar 
problem in Apollo’s use of the term, since his conception of male generation and hence his 
defence of a specific morality of revenge in fact denies the “genetic” role of the mother in 
procreation. But again, one could object that the dominant use of ἀδελφός in Aischylos’ 
epoch did not involve a notion of uterine unity, but expressed a far more mundane idea of 
brothers and sisters, including both types of half-siblings. The copulative ἀ- in ἀδελφός 
indicates sameness, and it could, as it were, be understood as used of brothers and sisters 
being “same” without any reference to their mothers’ womb. In order to assess this ob-
jection, we need to look at the compound αὐτάδελφος. Before we do this, we should note 
that the alpha copulativum and αὐτός both mean “same”, but that they are not related. 
The former stems from the Proto-Indo-European *sm̥-, “same” in English and, e.g., ἅμα, 
“together” in Greek, whereas αὐτός derives from the Proto-Indo-European roots *h₂ew, 
meaning “again” and *to (“that”) (Beekes 2010, 173; contrast however Frisk 1960–1970, 
I, 191–192). We cannot suppose that Aischylos had knowledge of these different origins, 
and there is no need to. Regardless of whether the poet invented the word himself or not, 
8 It could be objected that Aischylos’ etymologies typically convey their own explication in a direct manner, 
that is, that they are explicit in being etymologies, and explicit in the sense that they convey, and that this is evidently 
not the case with αὐτάδελφον αἷμα. While this is generally true of speaking names (but see Tsantsanoglou 2013, 
50, who discusses Septem 577 as an exception, a passage in which Aischylos gives “only the description of the 
procedure leading to the etymology”), αὐτάδελφον is not a proper name. And it would seem hard to deny that 
Aischylos uses the etymologically induced polysemy of individual words as a means to convey meaning in his 
poetry (cf., e.g., Verdenius 1985, 290, 292, 298). Moreover, Consuelo Reinberg (1980, 42–45, 48–54) has suggested 
that some etymologies in Aischylos are in fact used to subvert and revise the primary or prima facie meaning of a 
word (e.g. σῆμα in Septem 387 and the recurrent play of Πέρσαι and πέρθω in Persians), and these etymological 
plays would, as it were, resemble the one explored in this paper. (For a case in the Oresteia, the χίμαιρα of Ag. 232, 
see also Tralau 2016).
9 In this context, I cannot attempt to locate Aischylos along the dimension of Greek conceptions of language, 
from conventionalism to naturalism (as epitomized in Pl. Cra. 427d–435c). It would perhaps be too tempting 
to ascribe some sort of “naive” naturalism to him. For what it is worth, however, cf. Liebermann 1996, 36–37, 
who rejects wide-spread assumptions of Greek primitive name magic, and makes the argument that already the 
etymologies in epic (specifically, Hesiod) are the products of a reflective, sophisticated and critical view of language 
and names.
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the substitution of αὐτ- for ἀ-, and the use of the word in the tragedy, arguably emphasise 
and intensify the meaning of the prefix. The word calls attention to its parts – to same and 
womb. And this is, I will argue, confirmed by the other extant uses of the strange word.
The strangeness of αὐτάδελφος in the context of tragedy
While ἀδελφός is very common, αὐτάδελφος is a rare word. Until the end of the classical 
period, there are only six instances in extant literature. In order to see how αὐτάδελφος 
may have been or should be understood, we must look at the passages in which the word 
is used10. We are already familiar with one of them. The other five are likewise from 
tragedy, and the first recorded use is Aischylean.
The first one is to be found in Seven against Thebes, where the chorus anxiously 
ask Eteokles whether he is really going to fight his own brother: ἀλλ᾽ αὐτάδελφον αἷμα 
δρέψασθαι θέλεις, “but do you want to cull your autadelphon blood?” (A. Th. 718). The 
question clearly expresses repugnancy at the idea of killing one’s own sibling. Several 
commentaries refrain from discussing the word at all (Tucker 1908, 48; Todesco 1945, 
86; Hutchinson 1985, 160; cf. Verrall 1887, 86, who says that “the use of αἷμα in poetry 
is singularly loose”, but does not discuss αὐτάδελφον). Groeneboom, by contrast, argues 
that it implies “verwantschap in den volle zin des woords”, “kinship in the full sense of 
the word” (Groeneboom 1938, 205). In any case, the αὐτ- prefix cannot be interpreted 
as an intensification in the way that Groeneboom understood the word in the Eumenides, 
that is, “very brotherly, very beloved” (Groeneboom 1952, 106). Polyneikes is not “very 
brotherly” in the affective sense to Eteokles, nor vice versa. But if αὐτ- stresses sameness 
in a special way, then there is in fact not just “kinship in the full sense of the word”, but 
a particular strangeness and kinship to stress in the case of the brothers’ family. Their 
father, who has cursed them, is also their brother, for father and sons share something; 
they share their mother’s womb, as Aischylos emphasizes shortly thereafter when he lets 
the chorus sing of Οἰδιπόδαν, | ὅστε ματρὸς ἁγνὰν | σπείρας ἄρουραν, “Oidipus, who 
sowed his mother’s holy field”, and the ῥίζαν αἱματόεσσαν, “bloody root” of the family 
(A. Th. 752–755). Oidipus issues from the same womb as his own children11. And we 
may cautiously conjecture that this mythic fact gives a peculiar chilling tone to the word 
in this context: same and womb together cannot but recall a disconcerting fact.
It could be objected that this places far too much weight on a single instance of a rare 
word, and that this belongs to the realm of speculation. But the subsequent history of the 
10 Later, Lykophron employs αὐτάδελφον when speaking of Idomeneus as the alleged brother of Aithon 
(Alexandra 432). There are several reasons to be cautious about drawing any conclusions from this passage. First, it 
is true that Odysseus, in one of his marvelous lies (Od. 19. 183), presents himself as Aithon, brother of Idomeneus; 
but we do not know whether there was in fact a brother called Aithon in the mythic universe – “in fact” in the 
sense of external to Odysseus’ lie. Second, if there was one, then we still do not know the exact nature of their 
kinship, that is, in what sense they were brothers. Third, given the role of the Alexandra as an extreme case of 
Hellenistic Kunstsprache, with its heavy neologisms and fleeting and obscure references, a plausible discussion of 
the implications of the word for the question asked in this paper is difficult per se, and just not possible here.
11 Euripides will thus later say that the children are μίασμα πατρός (Ph. 816).
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word may be telling. Seven against Thebes was staged in 467 BC, the Oresteia in 458. 
The three next instances are later, from Sophokles’ Antigone, dating from 442 or 441.
The second αὐτάδελφον is found in in the very first verse of the play: Antigone 
addresses her sister as ὦ κοινὸν αὐτάδελφον Ἰσμήνης κάρα. The words are almost un-
translatable, but “common selfsame sibling Ismene” would give an idea of it12. Some 
commentators have understood this as “merely a poetical strengthening of ἀδελφός” 
(Jebb 1900, 1; Kamerbeek 1978, 37). Yet others have argued that αὐτάδελφον raises an 
ominous past. In this vein, Nicole Loraux has claimed that the many uses of αὐτ- words 
speak to the sameness of the womb, the incestuous generation of Oidipus’ children and the 
curse of the Labdakids; this language “sert à dire le lien du sang comme lieu d’inceste, de 
parricide, de suicide” (Loraux 1986, 167; Griffith 1999, 120, appears to be sympathetic 
to the interpretation). Moreover, Charles Segal has claimed that Antigone consistently 
raises the spectre of this origin, recalling the womb of Oidipus’ mother and wife. This is 
true of the use of αὐτάδελφον, but the notion appears in other ways and words as well. 
The heroine thus speaks of τοὺς ὁμοσπλάγχνους σέβειν, “reverence for those of the same 
womb”, as rendered by Segal (Ant. 511; Segal 1999, 183–185). And ὁμόσπλαγχνος – even 
more rare, the word only appears in one more place, perhaps tellingly, in Aischylos’ Seven, 
of the incestuously engendered brothers – literally means someone who is the “same” in 
issuing from the same σπλάγχνα, “inward parts”, in this case specifically “womb” (A. Th. 
889–890; this is likewise the case in Pi. O. 6.43). Furthermore, it has been argued that 
precisely this notion of a “community of the womb”, of blood relations, can account for 
Antigone’s notoriously enigmatic claim that she would sacrifice herself for a sibling and a 
parent, but not for a spouse (Tralau 2005, 390–392; 2010, 83–91). In these three passages 
from Antigone, the word αὐτάδελφον is only used of the siblings begotten by Oidipus and 
his mother: Ismene and, twice, the dead Polyneikes (S. Ant. 1, 503, 696).
The sixth possible, and final, instance is to be found a few decades later in Euripides’ 
Melanippe captive (F 495.18 Kannicht). The eponymous character’s sons by Poseidon 
have been adopted by Metapontos, king of Metapontium, and his queen Theano. The 
latter incites her brothers to try to kill the adopted twins. The text is disputed, but in a 
description of the assassination attempt, the word αὐταδέλφω may have been used of 
Theano’s brothers, the supposed uncles trying to kill them, as σὼ δ’ αὐταδέλφω, with 
the basic meaning “your brothers”13. This relates to distorted family relations, but there 
appears to be no reference to incest or outlandish embryological ideas. Yet in a different 
version of the myth, the corresponding characters were (supposedly biological, but in 
reality adopted) brothers instead, that is, sons of another woman whom Melanippe’s sons 
believed to be their mother (Hyginus, Fab. 186). Now, if Euripides invented the version 
where it was the brothers of the adoptive mother who attempted to kill Melanippe’s sons 
(as assumed by Romero Mariscal 2014, 205; cf. Jouan & van Looy 2000, 369), or if 
Hyginus’ variant is in any case older or just as old, then we may cautiously surmise that 
12 It would be Hölderlinesque to render the periphrasis Ἰσμήνης κάρα as “Ismene’s head” in the translation. For 
this, and many other objections, I am indebted to a generous anonymous reader.
13 Most editors print αὐταδέλφω; Weil suggested αὖτ᾽ἀδέλφω, but cf. van Looy 1964, 286.
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an Athenian audience would be aware of the latter version, in which an adoptive mother 
plots to have her (biological) sons kill her (adoptive) sons, who – unlike the spectator and 
reader – in fact believe that they issue from the same womb as their adoptive brothers. If 
this argument is sound, then αὐταδέλφω is likewise likely to elicit the idea of the womb, 
echoing the other version of the myth, and a troubling (lack of) uterine community, not 
unlike the wording and context in Antigone and Seven.
What can we make of this? To be perhaps superfluously clear, the point is not that the 
αὐτάδελφον employed by Apollo in Eumenides could evoke incest or the cursed family 
in Thebes. But we have seen that five other instances in which the word is used can reaso-
nably be construed as alluding to the womb. The other cases of αὐτάδελφον all seem 
reminiscent of the uterus in a very special and disconcerting way. And if they do, then 
we may be justified in interpreting Apollo’s αὐτάδελφον similarly: unlike an everyday 
ἀδελφός, the word reminds the listener and reader of the word’s components – “same” 
and “womb”. It could be objected that the passages in Antigone are irrelevant since they 
are probably dependent on the Seven and the Eumenides, whereas the opposite could not 
be the case. This is true, but it is only a half-truth. In a limited corpus of texts, one will 
often need to make inferences from later sources, and the suggestion that a certain use is 
later cannot be methodologically controlling14. The point to make here is that even if we 
do not know about other, earlier instances of the word, or whether Aischylos invented 
it, we will need to look at what Sophokles feels entitled to do with the word. Before and 
after the Oresteia, in the Seven, in Antigone, and in Melanippe captive, tragedy flashes 
the word in ways that evoke its origins – the womb.
The word’s rebellion: conclusions and implications
When Apollo speaks of his brother of the same father, before he develops the argument 
that the mother is not related to her child, he thus uses a word that highlights the very 
phenomenon that his doctrine excludes: the womb, and hence the role of the mother. 
This makes for a very special tension. Apollo’s wording does not constitute a logical 
inconsistency, for he does not make a statement that contradicts his embryological view 
and its companion idea of the ethic of retaliation. Yet while we are not dealing with a 
contradiction in the proper, logical sense, his formulation is incongruent with the ideas 
expounded in the defence of Orestes – incongruent in the sense of a linguistic tension, a 
terminological aberration given his later claim about exclusively male generation. When 
addressing his brother who has a different mother, he employs a word that calls attention 
to the same womb, thus prompting a special conception of siblingship that is enshrined 
in the word itself.
While it may, given the ambiguity of such a rare word, not be logically inconsistent 
to use the word of Hermes, its subtle connotations are ostentatiously incongruent with 
14 As I argued above, given his style, innovation and mannerisms, the implications of Lykophron’s use of the 
word (Alexandra 423) are, at the very least, hard to assess, and for that reason different from the information that 
can be gathered from a lexicon such as that of Hesychios. Later instances of the word, a millennium or further away, 
raise other problems, and I will not discuss them here.
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his and Apollo’s kinship relation. For the same reason, the use of the word may not be 
logically inconsistent with the embryological argument itself, but it does constitute a 
conceptual strangeness that needs to be accounted for. Speculation about a lost variant of 
the myth, in which Hermes and Apollo would in fact be sons of the same mother, is an 
ad hoc hypothesis that looks suspiciously convenient and ultimately impossible to prove 
(the idea, from Stanley & Butler 1812, 123, is justly criticized by Groeneboom 1952, 
106). Yet one way to understand the wording would be to say that this linguistic tension 
between the word and the idea indicates that the idea itself is in tension with reality, and 
that Aischylos’ text constructs Apollo’s language so as to disclose the one-sidedness and 
falsehood of his views. Even the words of the god who denies kinship between mother 
and child actually evoke the relation and the bond between the woman, the womb, and 
her offspring. Apollo develops a notion of kinship that his language revolts against.
One could object that the words are spoken hundreds of verses before Apollo expounds 
the embryological theory. Oliver Taplin has argued that “we should hesitate to explain 
anything earlier in the play in terms of something which is only divulged later” (Taplin 
1977, 18). While Taplin’s precept should remind us to be cautious, it cannot serve as 
a methodological police constable or prison guard. We have overwhelming reason to 
believe that poetry – perhaps in particular Aischylean poetry – operates by images that 
anticipate other images. They are, then, often “proleptic” in the sense that their meaning 
is disclosed and completed much later in the drama or in the trilogy (Lebeck 1971, 1). 
And Apollo’s embryologico-political arguments interact with his previous statements, in 
this case αὐτάδελφον. Indeed, and consequently, we may – perhaps must – suspect that 
hearing the argument about male generation of blood relatives at the Areopagos retroacti-
vely modifies or undermines the interpretation and credibility of other things that Apollo 
says about fathers, mothers, the womb, children and siblings.
Apollo employs a word evocative of the womb, and this makes his language incon-
gruent with the embryological theory that he relies on to justify a peculiar version of the 
politics of retaliation. Again: while not a logical inconsistency, this may be a subterranean 
indication that Apollo’s argument is flawed in excluding the mother – in embryological as 
well as political terms. The word αὐτάδελφον thus undermines the notion of exclusively 
male generation as well as the concomitant devaluation of the mother in Apollo’s ethics 
of revenge.
We are approaching the end. The implications of this interpretation for our understand-
ing of the verse at hand should be obvious – and to a lesser extent, this should be true of 
the role and doctrine of Apollo in the trilogy as well. Yet there may be other implications. 
It is almost universally held that the Oresteia heralds and celebrates the exclusion of 
women from the political and legal spheres. The view that the trilogy “stands squarely 
within the misogynistic tradition which pervades Greek thought” has a long modern his-
tory, with roots in Bachofen’s theories of matriarchy, and possibly beyond (Zeitlin 1984, 
160; Bachofen 1984, 190–196, 221–222; cf. Meier 1983, 185; Rocco 1997, 144; Foley 
2001, 201–202). It would perhaps be over-rash and hybristic to question this conception 
on the basis of a single verse. Yet it would seem that at this moment in Aischylos’ text, 
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the celebration of an all-male order and the exclusion of women is problematized, indeed 
subverted. Apollo’s own words conjure – in case someone had forgotten about it – the 
role of women, the womb, and mothers.
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